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ORGANIZATIONAL CONFORMITY AND 
PUNISHMENT: FEDERAL COURT 
COMMUNITIES AND JUDGE-INITIATED 
GUIDELINES DEPARTURES 
JEFFERY T. ULMER, PH.D* & 
BRIAN D. JOHNSON, PH.D** 
 
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines represent a uniform set of formal rules 
that are implemented across a broad range of diverse social 
contexts.  Drawing from neo-institutional theory and kindred perspectives 
on criminal courts, we argue that the federal courts represent an 
organizational field in which local influences play a key role in conformity 
to institutional rules.  We use unique survey data from federal judges, 
aggregated to the district court level and combined with individual-level 
federal sentencing data, to examine hierarchical models of judicial 
departures from the Guidelines.  Our analysis includes more proximate 
measures of court community culture than prior research.  We find that the 
collective views of federal judges, including their perceptions of the degree 
of regulative constraint posed by the Guidelines, as well as the extent to 
which the Guidelines are normatively and morally legitimate, are intimately 
related to variation in judicial Guidelines departures across district courts. 
  
 
*  Dr. Jeffery T. Ulmer is Professor and Associate Head of Sociology and Criminology at 
The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA. 
**  Dr. Brian D. Johnson is Professor and Graduate Director of Criminology and 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholarly research on organizational legitimacy, legal authority, and 
conformity to formalized rules represents an enduring cornerstone of 
sociological inquiry.  At the same time, recent scholarship on the sociology 
of punishment underscores the broad societal consequences of criminal 
punishment,1 in part because the exercise of state-sponsored social control 
is “shaped by an ensemble of social forces and has a significance and range 
of effects that reach well beyond the population of criminals.”2 Court actors 
must continually navigate the delicate balance between formally-structured 
rules and informal normative expectations.3 Examining organizational 
 
1  Darrell Steffensmeier et al., Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal 
Courts: Who is Punished More Harshly?, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 705, 718 (2000).  
2  David Garland, Sociological Perspectives on Punishment, 14 CRIME AND JUST. 115, 
119 (1991).  
3  JAMES EISENSTEIN ET AL., THE CONTOURS OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR 
COURTS 30–36 (1st ed. 1988). 
ULMER_FINAL PROOF_3.30.17 4/21/2017  3:08 PM 
2017] ORGANIZATIONAL CONFORMITY & PUNISHMENT 255 
 
conformity within criminal courts thus provides a unique opportunity to 
investigate the socio-legal clash of standardized decision-making rules and 
localized cultural norms across court contexts.4 
The federal justice system, in particular, is well-suited to an analysis of 
organizational conformity within the criminal courts.  In 1984, Congress 
passed the Federal Sentencing Reform Act, establishing the United States 
Sentencing Commission (USSC) and empowering it to promulgate 
sentencing guidelines to formally structure criminal sentences for all federal 
offenders.5  The goals of the federal Guidelines were to reduce unwarranted 
disparity, to ensure severe and uniform punishments, and to increase 
rationality and transparency in the federal punishment process.6 The 
Guidelines were originally mandatory, recognized as the most rigid and 
complex sentencing rules ever enacted.7 
However, in United States v. Booker8 in 2005, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the Guidelines would thereafter be advisory.9  Although federal 
judges still had to calculate and consider the Guidelines, they were no 
longer legally mandated to follow them.10 This change might mean less 
consistency and uniformity in sentencing between district courts. Recent 
research evidence, however, suggests that despite the fact that the 
Guidelines are only advisory now, they continue to shape federal 
punishments; that is, their legal and normative constraining power remains 
intact.11 However, this also raises important questions about local variations 
 
4  Jeffery T. Ulmer, The Localized Uses of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Four U.S. 
District Courts: Evidence of Processual Order, 28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 255, 272–76 
(2005).  
5  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE 




 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CONTINUING IMPACT OF 
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 12 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/news/
congressional-testimony-and-reports/booker-reports/report-continuing-impact-united-states-
v-booker-federal-sentencing [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012 REPORT]. 
7  KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 2–4 (1998). 
8  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
9  Id. at 222. Booker, along with subsequent decisions such as Gall v. United States, 552 
U.S. 38, 38–39 (2007), significantly expanded federal judges’ sentencing discretion.  
10  Gall, 552 U.S. at 45–46. 
11  Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., The “Liberation” of Federal Judges’ Discretion in the Wake 
of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: Is There Increased Disparity and Divergence between 
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in court actor perceptions of the Guidelines, and judicial conformity to 
them, as local court actors use their discretion to selectively deviate from 
formal rules and policies imposed from above. 
A primary example of organizational deviation occurs when federal 
judges “depart” by sentencing an offender to a punishment that falls outside 
the recommendations of the Guidelines.12  Departures can occur in several 
ways.  Some departures reflect prosecutorial discretion, such as departures 
for “substantial assistance” to the government in the prosecution of another 
case, government-sponsored departures that involve binding plea 
agreements, or pleas where a defense departure motion is not opposed by 
the government.13 Other departures are initiated explicitly by judicial 
discretion.14 Judges can sentence offenders outside the recommended 
sentencing ranges in accordance with special sentencing considerations laid 
out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which became especially relevant after the 
Guidelines became advisory.15 
 
Courts?, 28 JUST. Q. 799, 830 (2011); Amy Farrell et al., Examining District Variation in 
Sentencing in the Post-Booker Period, 23 FED. SENTENCING REP. 318, 320 (2011); Sonja B. 
Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of 
Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L. J. 2, 27 (2013).  
12  In the post-Booker era, a distinction can be made between “departures” and 
“deviations.”  In this terminology, departures are sentences that are above or below the 
Guideline range given for reasons that the USSC recognizes as legitimate. Substantial 
assistance and government-sponsored departures are of this class, as are certain judge-
initiated departures (5K2). Deviations from the Guidelines, however, are judge-initiated 
departure sentences that are not given in accordance with these factors—for example, a 
deviation from the Guidelines based on a judge’s policy disagreement with the Guidelines. 
Kimberly A. Kaiser & Cassia Spohn, “Fundamentally Flawed” Exploring the Use of Policy 
Disagreements in Judicial Downward Departures for Child Pornography Sentences, 13 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 241, 246–47 (2014). Prior to the Rita and Gall decisions, 
departures were permitted (but appealable) but deviations were not. In this paper, we 
combine both deviations and departures into our conceptualization of departures in the post-
Booker context, since we are interested in the Guidelines as institutional rules and standards 
that courts can interpret in different ways. We thank an anonymous reviewer for helping us 
clarify these distinctions.   
13  Cassia Spohn & Robert Fornango, U.S. Attorneys and Substantial Assistance 
Departures: Testing for Interprosecutor Disparity, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 813, 834–38 (2009). 
14  Rodney L. Engen & Randy R. Gainer, Modeling the Effects of Legally Relevant and 
Extralegal Factors Under Sentencing Guidelines: The Rules Have Changed, 38 
CRIMINOLOGY 1207, 1220–22 (2000).  
15  The categories of factors that can be considered under §3553(a) include the following: 
1) special offense and offender characteristics, 2) the need to reflect the basic aims and goals 
of sentencing, 3) consideration of the sentences that are legally available, 4) the sentencing 
guidelines, 5) sentencing commission policy statements, 6) the need to avoid unwarranted 
disparity, and 7) the need for restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2010).  
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Prior work has examined organizational conformity and departures 
from sentencing guidelines at both the state and federal level,16 but none of 
this work incorporates local court actor perceptions or attitudes towards 
their institutional environments. Our study incorporates measures of the 
collective attitudes and perceptions of federal judges towards the 
Sentencing Guidelines. This research combines insights from organizational 
sociology with empirical work on the social contexts of criminal 
punishment.  Using unique national survey data from federal judges, which 
is aggregated to the district level and combined with individual-level 
sentencing data, we examine organizational forces that affect judicial 
deviations from the Guidelines.  We then supplement these data with 
material from qualitative interviews with federal judges, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and probation officers to shed additional insight into 
reasons behind conformity to and deviation from the Guidelines, and how 
departure decisions are embedded in local court contexts. 
I.  THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT SYSTEM AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD 
The federal courts can be seen as an organizational field.17 
Organizational fields are “sets of interacting groups, organizations, and 
agencies oriented around a common substantive interest.”18 They are 
bounded by the presence of a common regulatory system or shared 
normative (systems of formal or informal social norms) or cultural-
cognitive frameworks (systems of cultural and cognitive meanings).19  
 
16  See, e.g., Celesta A. Albonetti, Direct And Indirect Effects Of Case Complexity, 
Guilty Plea, And Offender Characteristics On Sentencing For Offenders Convicted Of A 
White-Collar Offense Prior To Sentencing Guidelines, 14 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 
353, 353 (1998); Rodney L. Engen et al., Discretion and Under Guidelines: The Role of 
Departures and Structured Sentencing Alternatives, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 99, 107 (2003); Brian 
Johnson et al., The Social Context of Guideline Circumvention: The Case of Federal District 
Courts, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 737 (2008); John H. Kramer et al., Sentencing Disparity and 
Guidelines Departures, 13 JUST. Q. 81 (1996); John H. Kramer et al., Downward Departures 
for Serious Violent Offenders: Local Court “Corrections” to Pennsylvania’s Sentencing 
Guidelines, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 897 (2002); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender 
Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON. 285, 285 
(2001); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study 
of Charging and Bargaining Practices under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 501, 501 (1992).  
17  Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 
150 (1983).  
18  HOWARD E. ALDRICH & MARTIN REUF, ORGANIZATIONS EVOLVING 40 (2d ed. 2006). 
19  See W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: IDEAS AND INTERESTS 86, 
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Fligstein and McAdam refer to these strategic action fields as: “meso level 
social order[s] where actors (who can be individual or collective) interact 
with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings 
about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field (including who 
has power and why), and the field’s rules.”20  DiMaggio and Powell identify 
three types of isomorphism (meaning “similarity of form”)21: coercive, 
normative, and mimetic.22 Coercive isomorphism involves forced 
compliance, normative isomorphism involves acquiescence through 
established norms, behavioral expectations and perceived legitimacy, and 
mimetic isomorphism involves conformity through the routine application 
of shared cultural-cognitive tools that help reduce uncertainty.23  We view 
judicial adherence to the Guidelines (and, alternatively, departures (i.e., 
non-conformity)) from them as an example of the interplay between 
organizational isomorphism, conformity, and deviation from institutional 
rules. 
Importantly, foundations of institutional conformity are not mutually 
exclusive and can be intertwined in complex ways.24 The federal Guidelines 
likely produce sentencing uniformity by constraining departures through 
both coercive and normative influence.  For most of their history, a great 
deal of the Guidelines’ influence operated through their regulative and 
coercive power.  Prior to 2005, the Guidelines were mandatory; judges were 
required to conform to them or justify why a sentence that departed from 
the Guidelines was warranted due to extraordinary circumstances.25  Even 
then, the sentence could be appealed by the prosecution or defense, and the 
 
136–38 (3rd ed. 2008). 
20  Neil Fligstein & Doug McAdam, Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action 
Fields, 29 SOC. THEORY 1, 3 (2011).  
21  Calvin Morrill & Cindy McKee, Institutional Isomorphism and Informal Social 
Control: Evidence from a Community Mediation Center, 40 SOC. PROBS. 445, 449 (1993).  
22  DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 17, at 150.  
23  SCOTT, supra note 19, at 160–61 (elaborating on these organizational influences, 
identifying three primary influences in organizational conformity: 1) regulative, (i.e., 
coercive isomorphism), which entails coercive pressure toward conformity through 
expedience and cost-benefit rationality; 2) normative (i.e., normative isomorphism) in which 
organizations conform through normative obligations, expectations, or shared morality; and 
3) cultural-cognitive (i.e., mimetic isomorphism) which involves conformity through 
common efforts at “sense making); see also KARL WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 
17 (1995).   
24  SCOTT, supra note 19, at 1610–16. 
25
 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012 REPORT, supra note 6, at 3, 45; Kate Stith, The Arc of 
the Pendulum, Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 
1423 (2008).  
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circuit courts had the power to conduct a de novo review of the sentence.26  
Prior to the 2005 Booker decision, the circuit courts gave great deference to 
the Guidelines and held high standards for departures.27 
But when the Guidelines were rendered advisory by Booker, their 
regulative power to restrict departures was substantially weakened.28 Yet, 
from 2005 onward, the large majority of federal sentences continued to 
conform to the Guidelines, even though they had become merely advisory 
and did not have the same mandatory, coercive power.29  This raises the 
possibility that the Guidelines do not merely influence court actors through 
regulative constraint but also through informal normative influence.  In line 
with this, Scott suggests that in situations when legal constraint is reduced 
or ambiguous, the “law is better conceived of as an occasion for sense-
making and collective interpretation, relying more on cognitive and 
normative than coercive elements for its effects.”30  This suggests that the 
extent to which the advisory Guidelines restrict departures and maintain 
organizational uniformity across contexts may depend in large part on 
normative influences (as well as mimetic, uncertainty-reducing influences, 
to which we return at the end of our analysis).  This would occur if the 
once-mandatory Guidelines have become embedded in organizational 
sentencing practices as expected norms or established informal rules. 
For example, the Guidelines might have come to be seen as the 
embodiment of best practice sentencing standards—the product of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission’s careful research and prescriptions that bear the 
stamp of congressional approval.  To the extent that local court actors 
conform to the Guidelines because they view them as legitimate and 
effective organizational policy, these influences are normative in nature.31  
 
26   De novo review of departure sentences was one feature established by the Feeney 
Amendment to the 2003 PROTECT Act from Congress. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-
21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
27  See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 7, at 1463 (discussing the limitations on 
discretion in departing from the Guidelines imposed on district court judges by an abuse of 
discretion standard of review). 
28  Id. at 1481 (discussing the post-Booker shift returning discretion to judges). 
29  Paul J. Hofer, United States v. Booker as a Natural Experiment: Using Empirical 
Research to Inform the Federal Sentencing Policy Debate, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
433, 456 (2007); Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., The “Liberation” of Federal Judges’ Discretion in 
the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: Is There Increased Disparity and Divergence 
between Courts?, supra note 11 at 799, 830; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012 REPORT, supra 
note 6, at 10. 
30  SCOTT, supra note 19, at 54. 
31  Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Racial Disparity in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision: 
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Thus, the Guidelines would become benchmarks from which localized 
understandings of appropriate “going rates” are established for “normal 
crimes.”32 Once the Guidelines become embedded in organizational 
sentencing practices as expected norms and informal rules (or “going 
rates,)” they are likely to continue to shape punishment even when their 
formal regulative power is curtailed. 
A.  FEDERAL COURTS AS LOCAL “COURT COMMUNITIES” 
There are a number of reasons why one might expect considerable 
uniformity in sentencing and Guideline conformity across district courts. 
High rates of compliance might reflect the substantial regulatory and 
normative force of the Guidelines and lead to minimal district-to-district 
variation in Guidelines departures across the federal courts.  Even though 
the Guidelines are advisory, they were once mandatory, and federal law still 
requires that they be correctly calculated and considered as a benchmark in 
every case.33  The USSC monitors adherence to the Guidelines and trains 
federal court officials in the Guidelines’ application, interpretation, and case 
law.34  Politically, federal judges—unlike their state-level counterparts—are 
appointed for life terms, limiting the potential impact of local political and 
reelection concerns.35 Moreover, deep-seated normative themes that 
emphasize equal treatment before the law may provide additional incentives 
for uniformity in federal punishment, what Eisenstein and associates refer 
to as “national legal culture—shared values and attitudes about how persons 
charged with crimes should be treated.”36  Finally, at this point in history, 
most federal judges have never made sentencing decisions without the 
 
An Alternative Analysis to the USSC’s 2010 Report, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1081, 
1115–16 (2011); Ulmer et al., supra note 11, at 831.  
32  David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public 
Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255, 260, 262 (1965) (discussing sentencing norms that 
develop in courts for offenses organizationally seen by court personnel as “normal crimes.” 
Ulmer and Kramer evolved this concept further as the concept of “going rates,” and applied 
it in studying the informal use of sentencing guidelines); JEFFERY ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS 
OF SENTENCING: COURT COMMUNITIES UNDER SENTENCING GUIDELINES 173 (1997); JOHN H. 
KRAMER & JEFFERY ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: LESSONS FROM PENNSYLVANIA 120 
(2009) [hereinafter KRAMER & ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. 
33  Stith, supra note 25, at 1479–80.  
34  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012 REPORT, supra note 6, at 28–31.  
35  Carlos Berdejo et al., Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political 
Cycles in Criminal Sentencing, 95 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 741, 754 (2013).  
36  EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 12–13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Guidelines,37 so many contemporary judges likely rely on the Guidelines as 
a guiding constitutive scheme of categories and decision rules. 
If the Guidelines constrain court actor behavior based on a mixture of 
coercive and normative influences, then why should organizational 
conformity vary across contexts? Organizational scholars have identified 
several mechanisms through which the same institutional rules result in 
differences in organizational conformity.38 These include varying 
interpretations of institutional rules, unique cultural influences that affect 
local responses to institutional pressures, and specific adaptations, 
innovations, and strategic responses by different actors and organizations.39  
Although the Guidelines represent a uniform set of formalized rules, they 
illustrate a fundamental tension between efforts designed to promote 
uniformity in punishment and interests that emphasize flexibility, 
individualization, and localization of punishment.40 
We argue that U.S. district courts are organizational arenas where 
criminal punishments are subject to a set of overarching “field-wide” rules 
(the Guidelines) that constrain court actor behavior through a mixture of 
regulative/coercive and informal normative influence.  Compliance to the 
Guidelines, however, can and does vary across district courts.  We posit that 
part of the explanation for this variation may be that judges in different 
contexts differentially interpret and apply the Guidelines in ways that reflect 
differences in their perceived normative and coercive influences, as well as 
related perceptions of their local organizational environments. 
Local variation in the implementation of sentencing policies, such as 
sentencing guidelines, is a persistent theme in empirical research on state 
 
37  Celesta A. Albonetti, Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing: An Intersection of 
Policy Priorities and Law, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1151, 1152–53 (2011); see also 
Stith, supra note 25, at 1424; KRAMER & ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 
13.  
38  Jo Dixon, The Organizational Context of Criminal Sentencing, 100 AM. J. SOC. 1157, 
1183 (1995); SCOTT, supra note 19, at 160–62; Joachim Savelsberg, Law that Does Not Fit 
Society: Sentencing Guidelines as a Neoclassical Reaction to the Dilemmas of 
Substantivized Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1346, 1355 (1992).  
39  Judson G. Everitt, Inhabitants Moving In: Prospective Sense-Making and the 
Reproduction of Inhabited Institutions in Teacher Education, 36 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 
177, 193–95 (2013); Fligstein & McAdam, supra note 20, at 4–5; Brian D. Johnson, The 
Multilevel Context of Criminal Sentencing: Integrating Judge- and County-Level Influences, 
44 CRIMINOLOGY 259, 264–66 (2006).  
40  Dixon, supra note 38, at 1167; Kramer et al., Sentencing Disparity and Guidelines 
Departures, supra note 16, at 101; Savelsberg, supra note 38, at 1361.  
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and federal courts.41 Prior work argues that federal district courts can be 
understood as “court communities” that interpret formal institutional rules 
in locally-distinctive ways that produce variation in organizational 
compliance.42 Scholars in this tradition view courts as unique social worlds, 
based on participants’ shared workplace, interdependent working relations 
between the prosecutor’s office, judges’ bench, and defense bar, and 
importantly, broader social influences from the surrounding environment.43 
These court communities exhibit distinctive organizational cultures, which 
establish formal and informal case processing and sentencing norms.44 
Importantly, court communities are open, not closed, systems—their 
contours are shaped by their surrounding sociopolitical and legal 
environments.45 Dixon, for instance, argues that dominant case processing 
strategies differ across courts according to their social, political, and 
organizational contexts.46  More generally, a sizeable number of studies 
demonstrate that state and federal court communities’ case processing and 
sentencing practices are conditioned by features of their surrounding socio-
political and organizational contexts.47 
Similar arguments have been applied to related areas of the justice 
system as well, such as policing.  Ingram and his coauthors, for instance, 
 
41  ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING, supra note 32, at 166–67; Dixon, supra note 
38, at 1164; Rodney L. Engen & Sara Steen, The Power to Punish: Discretion and 
Sentencing Reform in the War on Drugs, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1357, 1383–84 (2000). 
42  Paula M. Kautt, Location, Location, Location: Interdistrict and Intercircuit Variation 
in Sentencing Outcomes for Federal Drug-Trafficking Offenses, 19 JUST. Q. 633, 641 (2002); 
Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 769; Spohn & Fornango, supra note 13, at 819; Jeffery T. 
Ulmer et al., Trial Penalties in Federal Sentencing: Extra-Guidelines Factors and District 
Variation, 27 JUST. Q. 560, 588 (2010); Amy Anderson et al., Lawlessness In the Federal 
Sentencing Process: A Test for Uniformity and Consistency in Sentencing Practices, 27 
JUST. Q. 362, 367 (2010).  
43  EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 35; ROY B. FLEMMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF 
JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES 10–11 (1992); ULMER, 
SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING, supra note 32, at 27; Jeffery T. Ulmer & Brian Johnson, 
Sentencing in Context: A Multilevel Analysis, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 140 (2004).  
44  See EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 231; Jeffery T. Ulmer & John Kramer, The 
Use and Transformation of Formal Decision Making Criteria: Sentencing Guidelines, 
Organizational Contexts, and Case Processing Strategies, 45 SOC. PROBS. 248, 251 (1998); 
ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING, supra note 32, at 165–68. 
45  EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 260; ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING, 
supra note 32, at 165–68; KRAMER & ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 
134–37. 
46  Dixon, supra note 38, at 1192.  
47  See Jeffery T. Ulmer, Recent Developments and New Directions in Sentencing 
Research, 29 JUST. Q. 1, 11–16 (2012).  
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maintain that individual police attitudes become amplified into a collective 
feature of the police workgroup and department culture.48  Similarly, we 
posit that local court organizational culture may be reflected in the 
collective attitudes and beliefs of federal court workgroups.  Therefore, an 
examination of local court actors’ attitudes and beliefs about the Guidelines 
and their court environments may provide unique insight into key sources 
of variations in federal Guidelines conformity. 
B.  FEDERAL COURTS, GUIDELINES DEPARTURES, AND CONTEXTUAL 
VARIATION IN PUNISHMENT 
The vast majority of prior research on the federal courts examines 
inequalities associated with markers of social stratification in society, such 
as defendant race, ethnicity, gender, or citizenship.49 One important finding 
from this work is that each type of Guideline departure represents an 
important potential locus of disparity.50 A second key finding is that 
between-district variation in federal punishment (including departures) is 
common.51 The U.S. Sentencing Commission noted that court disparities 
arise from numerous sources including the relative weight placed on 
different sentencing factors across regions, variation in case law and court 
personnel, and the uniqueness of political climates, local norms, caseloads, 
 
48  Jason Ingram et al., A Multilevel Framework for Understanding Police Culture: The 
Role of the Workgroup, 51 THE ROLE OF THE WORKGROUP 365, 372 (2013). 
49  Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of 
Defendant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes for Drug 
Offenses, 1991–1992, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 789, 798 (1997); Albonetti, supra note 16, at 369–
70; John Hagan et al., The Differential Sentencing of White-Collar Offenders in Ten Federal 
District Courts, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 802, 810 (1980); Richard Hartley et al., Prosecutorial 
Discretion: An Examination of Substantial Assistance Departures in Federal Crack-Cocaine 
and Powder-Cocaine Cases, 24 JUST. Q. 382, 391–92 (2007); Johnson et al., supra note 16, 
at 749; Kautt, supra note 42, at 644–45; Spohn & Fornango, supra note 13, at 822; 
Steffensmeier et al. supra note 1, at 709; Ulmer et al., supra note 11, at 809; Ulmer et al., 
Racial Disparity in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Decision, supra 31, at 1090; U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 5, at 120.  
50  Albonetti, supra note 49, at 817; Celesta A. Albonetti, The Role of Gender and 
Departures in the Sentencing of Defendants Convicted of a White-Collar Offense Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW, AND DEVIANCE 3, 37 (Jeffery 
T. Ulmer ed., 1998); Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 740–41, 772; Mustard, supra note 16, 
at 312. 
51  Kautt, supra note 42, at 658; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 5, at 101; 
Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 767–68; Mona Lynch & Marissa Omori, Legal Change and 
Sentencing Norms in the Wake of Booker: The Impact of Time and Place on Drug 
Trafficking Cases in Federal Court, 48 L. & SOC. REV. 411, 411 (2014); Ulmer et al., supra 
note 11, at 828. 
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and practical constraints in each federal court environment.52 
Relatively little empirical work examines the factors that account for 
jurisdictional variations in Guidelines conformity.  Prior empirical 
scholarship typically controls for, but does not investigate, between-court 
variation in sentencing practices.53 Only a few studies provide in-depth 
examinations of between-court variation in federal punishment or 
Guidelines conformity.54 Kautt, for instance, found significant between-
court variation in the sentencing of federal drug trafficking cases, but little 
of this variation was explained by district-level factors.55  Johnson and his 
coauthors reported substantial variation in the use of Guidelines departures 
across federal courts.56 They found some evidence for the salience of 
caseload pressure and community characteristics, but these effects were 
small and inconsistent across types of departure.57  Qualitative interviews in 
this work hinted at the importance of local cultural norms and established 
organizational routines, but no direct measures of these influences were 
available.58 Similar conclusions were described in recent analyses of federal 
drug trafficking cases by Lynch and Omori.59  They examined temporal and 
jurisdictional variations in federal sentencing tied to the Booker decision 
and concluded that “local legal practices not only diverge in important ways 
across place, but also become entrenched over time such that top-down 
legal reform is largely reappropriated and absorbed into locally established 
practices.”60 
The organizational perspectives discussed above imply that judges 
 
52  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 5, at 93. 
53  See, e.g., Hartley et al., supra note 49, at 393; R.S. Everett et al., Difference, 
Disparity, and Race, Ethnic Bias in Federal Sentencing, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 
189, 196–98 (2002); Paula Kautt & Cassia Spohn, Cracking Down on Black Drug 
Offenders? Testing for Interactions Among Offenders’ Race, Drug Type, and Sentencing 
Strategy in Federal Drug Sentences, 19 JUST. Q. 1, 12–13 (2002); Steffensmeier et al., supra 
note 1, at 713.   
54  Amy Farrell et al., Race Effects of Representation Among Federal Court Workers: 
Does Black Workforce Representation Reduce Sentencing Disparities?, 623 ANNALS OF THE 
AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 121, 126 (2009); Ben Feldmeyer et al., Racial/Ethnic 
Threat and Federal Sentencing, 48 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 238, 248–49 (2011); Johnson 
et al., supra note 16, at 754–56; Mona Lynch & Marissa Omori, supra note 51, at 425–26; 
Kautt, supra note 42, at 651–53; Ulmer et al., supra note 11, at 810.  
55  Kautt, supra note 42, at 658–59. 
56  Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 764. 
57  Id. at 766. 
58  Id. at 769–70. 
59  Lynch & Omori, supra note 51, at 439–40. 
60  Id. at 411.  
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conform to the Guidelines because they experience coercive regulatory 
pressure to do so or because they believe in the normative validity of these 
rules as useful and valid decision-making tools.  The court community 
perspective argues, in turn, that these types of organizational influences 
may vary significantly across federal district court contexts.61  Although 
much prior research recognizes the importance of examining local courts’ 
organizational environments, including judges’ views of sentencing 
guidelines, direct measures of these are routinely absent from empirical 
studies of criminal punishment.62  The vast majority of research relies on 
coarse aggregate measures of court contextual features, such as court size, 
case flow characteristics, or broad community factors like the proportion of 
the population belonging to certain minority groups.63  Although these are 
all theoretically salient, none of them tap directly into the attitudinal 
environment of federal court judges toward important institutional rules 
such as the Guidelines. 
To address this issue, the current study utilizes unique survey data 
from federal judges to construct measures of collective perceptions of the 
normative and coercive influences of the Guidelines. Judge-initiated 
departures represent a lack of organizational conformity—criminal cases 
that are sentenced outside the recommended Guidelines ranges (for 
whatever reasons) represent decisions where judges chose not to follow 
formal institutional sentencing rules.  We focus on two interrelated research 
questions.  First, we expect that judicial departures from Guidelines will 
vary across contexts according to judges’ collective perceptions of their 
normative legitimacy.  In districts where the Guidelines are perceived to be 
more valid, utile, or effective, judges will be less likely to depart from them.  
Second, we expect that judicial departures from Guidelines will also vary 
according to their coercive influences. The stronger the perceived 
regulatory force of the Guidelines, the less likely judges will be to deviate 
from them.  Coercive influences can take several forms, including shared 
cultural views of the Guidelines themselves as well as regulatory oversight 
from U.S. Attorney’s Offices (USAO) and circuit courts. 
 
61  KRAMER & ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 3–4; JAMES 
EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 22–30. 
62  Brian Johnson et al., The Multilevel Context of Criminal Sentencing: Integrating 
Judge and County Level Influences in the Study of Courtroom Decision Making, 44 
CRIMINOLOGY 259, 262–63 (2006); Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Court Communities Under 
Sentencing Guidelines: Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing Disparity 34 
CRIMINOLOGY 383, 399–401 (1996). 
63  See, e.g., Ulmer, supra note 47, at 14.  
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Although the survey data we examine contain measures that map 
directly onto the coercive and normative influences of the Guidelines, our 
data does not provide any direct quantitative measures that capture 
“mimetic isomorphism”—that is, how the Guidelines might foster 
conformity by reducing uncertainty and by devising categories and 
classifications that simplify complex decision-making processes.64  We 
draw on supplemental interview data from federal judges, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and probation officers to illustrate our quantitative 
findings and to further suggest the potential importance of mimetic, 
uncertainty-reduction factors in judicial departures and Guideline 
conformity. 
II. DATA AND METHODS 
Two sources of data are combined in the current study.  First, 
individual level sentencing data from the USSC are merged for fiscal year 
2005 with fiscal year 2007.  These data were restricted to district courts 
located within the United States, excluding foreign territories.  The 
sentencing data were limited to cases sentenced after the Booker decision in 
January of 2005, which rendered the Guidelines advisory rather than 
mandatory, but before the Gall decision in December of 2007, which 
widened judicial discretion further than Booker by clarifying that courts 
need not presume the Guideline sentences to be reasonable for a given 
individual case.  This time period encompasses the administration of our 
federal court survey and captures the period of flux and legal uncertainty 
after Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory, but before Gall and 
subsequent decisions clarified what “advisory” meant.65  This is an 
important time period because this was potentially a time of uncertainty and 
variation among judges in the perceived constraint and normative authority 
of the Guidelines. 
Second, the individual sentencing data were augmented with survey 
data on the cultural milieu of federal district courts.  District-level measures 
of court culture were created from surveys of federal district judges.  As 
part of a larger research project, 314 interviews were conducted with federal 
court actors in seven geographically dispersed districts of varying size.  We 
also use the qualitative data to illustrate, contextualize, and elaborate upon 
 
64  See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 17, at 149 (defining and describing the notion of 
institutional isomorphism). 
65  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005); Gall v. United States, 552 
U.S. 38, 47 (2007). 
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our quantitative findings. In particular, the interview data help to 
demonstrate ways that perceptions of the coercive, normative, and mimetic 
influences of the Guidelines vary across district courts.66  Information from 
these interviews was used to construct a role-specific survey of federal 
court actors.67  In the fall of 2005, we sent invitations to participate in this 
survey by both email and U.S. mail to all active federal judges.  The survey 
was also sent to other federal court actors, but given our focus on judge-
initiated Guideline departures, this study relies only on data from federal 
judges, which were received between October of 2005 and June of 2006. 
Overall, valid survey responses were returned by judges in 82 of the 90 
U.S. district courts for a district-level response rate of over 90%.  At the 
time of the survey there were a total of 639 authorized federal district 
judgeships (excluding foreign territories).  We received valid responses 
from 262 judges, which accounted for over 40% of all federal judges sitting 
on the bench at that time.  Although the individual-level response rate is 
relatively low, a low response rate does not necessarily entail non-response 
error or invalidity68; it compares favorably with phone-based public opinion 
polls69 and it provides valid survey data for the overwhelming majority of 
federal districts, which serve as the primary unit of analysis in the study.  
There are no a priori reasons to suspect systematic non-response bias on the 
part of federal judges, and there were no discernable statistical differences 
across a variety of district-level characteristics for federal courts included in 
the sample compared to those that are excluded.70 The number of judge 
responses per district varied, which we address through weighting 
 
66  See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 17, at 150.   
67  We pre-tested role-specific drafts of the survey with five judges, eight federal public 
defenders or CJA Panel attorneys, and four federal probation officers. Based on their 
feedback, we were able to shorten, refine, and clarify the survey. The survey took between 
30 to 60 minutes to complete. We developed both a web-based and paper version of the 
survey. We obtained names and addresses of all current district court judges from the 
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) and sent paper survey packets to all federal district court 
judges listed by FJC rosters. An enclosed letter gave them the option of taking the survey on 
the web, or taking the enclosed paper version. This was followed by reminder postcards to 
non-responders three weeks later and then a duplicate survey packet to remaining non-
responders three weeks after that. A final reminder letter was sent in spring of 2006.  
68  See Don Dillman, The Design and Administration of Mail Surveys, 17 ANN. REV. OF 
SOC. 225, 229 (1991) (arguing that low response rate does not necessarily entail non-
response error or invalidity). 
69  See PEW RES. CENTER, ASSESSING THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF PUBLIC OPINION 
SURVEYS 1 (2012), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Assessing%20the%20Repre
sentativeness%20of%20Public%20Opinion%20Surveys.pdf.  
70  See infra Appendix, Table A1.   
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procedures described below. The complete survey instrument and additional 
details about the survey’s sampling, data, and measures are available from 
the first author by request.  The final sentencing sample includes 162,870 
criminal cases sentenced within the 82 federal district courts for which we 
have valid survey data.71 
A.  INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES 
The analysis focuses on judicial decisions to conform to or deviate 
from the formal sentencing recommendations of the Guidelines.  We focus 
specifically on downward departures. We do not examine upward 
departures (departures above the Guidelines) because they are very rare 
(1.6% of cases), and because there is insufficient variation in their 
occurrence (i.e., some districts report no upward departures).  The 
dependent variable separates downward departures by judges (coded 1) 
from cases sentenced within the Guidelines (coded 0).  It captures other 
downward departures controlled by the prosecutor in a third category to 
prevent them from being confounded with the primary contrast of interest.  
Because our fundamental interest is in the comparison between judge-
initiated departures and conforming cases, we focus our discussion of 
findings on this comparison, though complete results for the other contrasts 
are available by request. 
The federal sentencing data include detailed variables that capture 
specific information on socio-demographic offender characteristics, legal 
offense characteristics, guidelines calculations, and relevant case-processing 
considerations.  The presumptive Guideline sentence is utilized to control 
for the combined nonlinear effects of offense severity and prior record.72 It 
is comprised of the final adjusted minimum months of incarceration 
recommended under the Guidelines, after all mitigating and aggravating 
factors and statutory trumps (i.e., mandatory minimums) are incorporated.73  
It is standardized so a one-unit change reflects one standard deviation.  In 
line with prior work,74 a separate measure is also included for the six-point 
scale that captures defendant criminal history.  This did not result in 
 
71  The eight federal districts for which no judge survey data were obtained are 
geographically dispersed and diverse in population and socioeconomic characteristics. They 
include North Carolina Middle, Tennessee Middle, Idaho, Utah, Hawaii, New York North, 
Georgia Middle, and Colorado. 
72  Engen & Gainey, supra note 14, at 1208–09.  
73  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 5, 
at 16–18. 
74  Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 753.  
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problematic collinearity between the presumptive sentence and criminal 
history score (r=.35). 
The type of crime is captured by a series of dummy variables for 
violent, property, firearms, fraud, immigration, drug, and “other” offenses 
with the reference being fraud crime.75  A separate dummy variable is coded 
1 for pretrial detainment and 0 for pretrial release. The type of conviction is 
captured with a variable coded 1 for bench or jury trials and 0 for guilty 
pleas.  Dummy variables are also included for the sentencing year to control 
for potential temporal variations in sentencing with 2005 as the reference 
year.  Age of the offender is included as the number of years at the time of 
sentencing.  Gender is coded 1 for females and 0 for males, and race and 
ethnicity are included as a series of dummy variables, for black, Hispanic, 
and other race, with white defendants the reference group.  A separate 
dummy variable is included for citizenship, with non-citizens coded 0 and 
U.S. citizens coded 1.  Educational attainment is included as a categorical 
variable scored 1 for offenders with any college education or higher and 0 
for offenders with a high school degree or less.  The number of financial 
dependents, capped at 10, is also included in the model. 
B.  DISTRICT-LEVEL VARIABLES 
Prior research suggests that jurisdiction size is one of the most 
important structural characteristics of criminal courts.76 We therefore 
control for district size, as measured by the number of authorized 
judgeships in each federal district.  We also control for the caseload 
pressure of the court,77 operationalized as the number of cases sentenced in 
the district during the study period divided by the number of sentencing 
judges.  Finally, we control for the total crime rate in the district, which is 
aggregated to federal districts from county-level Uniform Crime Report 
data. 
We use aggregated survey items to capture judicial perceptions of 
normative versus coercive organizational influences that may encourage 
Guidelines conformity or departures. Normative influences tap into judicial 
attitudes about the legitimacy, effectiveness and morality of the Guidelines.  
Using Likert scales, judges were asked about the extent to which they 
 
75  Other offenses include relatively uncommon crimes not subsumed by the other major 
crime categories, such as environmental crimes, pornography and prostitution, and 
gambling/lottery offenses.   
76  EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 283; Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Sentencing in Context: 
A Multilevel Analysis, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 167 (2004).  
77  See Dixon, supra note 38, at 1166.  
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agreed or disagreed with statements such as: a) “The sentencing 
commission has done a pretty remarkable job”; b) “Pre-guidelines there was 
great disparity, now disparity is much less”; c) “Congress has spoken and I 
have sworn to uphold what they have done”; and d) “The Sentencing 
Guidelines have failed to achieve their goals” (reverse coded).  These items 
are combined into a summative scale capturing the Normative Influence of 
the Guidelines (α=.64). 
Three additional scales capture different coercive forces that may 
affect the judicial use of departures.  The first coercive factor, Coercive 
Guidelines, captures perceptions of the restrictiveness of the guidelines 
(α=.70).  Judges were asked to what extent they agreed that: a) “If judges 
want to get something done, they can do it”; b) “Judges are regaining 
sentencing discretion” under the Guidelines; and c) “Judges have much 
more sentencing discretion after the Booker decision.”  All items are reverse 
coded so higher scores reflect perceptions of less discretion and more 
coercion under the Guidelines.  A second coercive factor, Coercive USAO, 
involves perceptions of the regulatory and coercive influence of the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office (α=.60).  This measure included three items capturing the 
extent to which: a) the “USAO appealed departures routinely”; b) the 
degree to which the “U.S. Attorney sets the tone” in the district; and c) the 
extent to which the “USAO drives the system” and “is generally 
unaccommodating.”  A third and final coercive factor, Coercive Circuits, 
captures perceptions of the restrictive influence of the circuit courts (α=.64).  
This factor consisted of two items.  Judges were asked if they agreed that: 
a) “Most of the decisions that come out of [this] Circuit wind up being good 
for the government”; and the extent to which b) “you had better spell out 
your reasons and really lay it out in terms of why a case is outside the 
heartland, or else they [the Circuit] will reverse you.” 
C.  ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
This study analyzes judicial Guidelines conformity using hierarchical 
generalized linear models.  Our analytic strategy captures alternative 
departure mechanisms by using a multinomial dependent variable that 
separates downward departures initiated by judges from conforming 
sentences.  We focus the analysis on judge-initiated departures because we 
are theoretically interested in the discretionary behavior of federal judges 
and because our survey measures of perceptions of Guidelines are specific 
to judges.  Consistent with prior work on federal departures,78 other 
 
78  See Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 770. 
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departures that are controlled by prosecutors are isolated in a separate 
category of the dependent variable to prevent them from confounding the 
key comparison between judicial departures and non-departures.  Full 
results are available by request. 
The multilevel model accounts for the fact that individual criminal 
cases nested within federal courts may share unaccounted-for similarities.  
It includes an additional error term to capture district-specific variance, it 
corrects misestimated standard errors, and it properly adjusts statistical 
significance tests as well as providing additional analytical advantages as 
detailed in elsewhere.79 Consistent with prior work,80 we specify a two-level 
random-coefficient model with federal cases nested within district courts.81  
Equivalent results were obtained using a random-intercept model with fixed 
coefficients.  All variables are centered on their grand means and robust 
standard errors are reported. The coefficients from these models are 
exponentiated to produce relative risk ratios. 
When using judicial surveys to tap into district court collective 
attitudes, it is important to investigate inter-rater agreement in survey 
responses among judges within the same district.  This is a frequent issue 
that arises in organizational research that examines issues such as employee 
ratings of workplace climate.82 In our case, multiple federal judges rated 
their district court environments.  The rWG statistic is the most commonly 
used index for evaluating inter-rater agreement when multiple judges rate 
the same environmental outcome.83 These statistics are reported in the 
Appendix (see Table A2) and show that judges within the same district 
courts consistently demonstrate moderate to high agreement in their 
responses, with levels of inter-judge agreement falling well within common 
standards for justifying the aggregation of individual-level survey data.84  
 
79  Lauren Shermer & Brian Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions: Examining Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District Courts, 27 JUSTICE Q. 394, 420–
21 (2010). 
80  See, e.g., Lynch & Omori, supra note 51, at 411. 
81  The following variables demonstrated significant variation in their effects across 
districts and were therefore included as random coefficients: presumptive sentence, criminal 
history, multiple counts, pretrial detention, and offender age, gender, race and ethnicity. 
82  See, e.g., Charles Glisson et al., The Cross-Level Effects Of Culture And Climate In 
Human Service Teams, 23 J. ORG. BEHAV. 767, 780 (2002); L.R. James et al., Estimating 
Within-Group Interrater Reliability With And Without Response Bias, 69 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 85, 85 (1984). 
83  James L. LeBreton et al., Answers to 20 Questions About Interrater Reliability and 
Interrater Agreement, 11 ORGANIZATIONAL RES. METHODS 815, 818 (2008).   
84  See id. at 836 (providing useful standards for evaluating the rWG statistic. They 
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Furthermore, there is greater between-district variation in judicial responses 
than the within-district variation, which suggests that the individual survey 
data can be reliably used to tap into meaningful variation in district-level 
collective judicial perceptions of the Guidelines. 
An additional complication introduced by the use of judicial surveys is 
that different districts have varying numbers of judges and varying judicial 
response rates.  We address this issue by using weighting procedures to 
account for differential response rates across districts.  The level 2 units 
were weighted by overall response rates for each district, so that districts 
with higher response rates contribute more to the level 2 estimates.85  
Overall, the combination of unique survey data on federal judges’ views of 
the Guidelines with actual sentencing data on judicial departure patterns 
offers a unique opportunity to investigate the organizational influences that 
shape criminal punishment across federal court communities. 
Following our discussion of the quantitative analysis, we also present 
illustrative material from the interview data noted earlier.  We have direct 
survey measures that tap into both coercive and normative influences that 
may affect Guidelines conformity and departures, but our qualitative data 
are useful for also suggesting the potential importance of additional 
mimetic, uncertainty-reducing influences not captured by our survey. 
III.  FINDINGS 
A.  DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Table 1 reports the results of descriptive statistics for the individual 
and contextual variables examined. The majority of offenders are sentenced 
within the recommended Guidelines range, with 13% of offenders receiving 
discretionary departures below the guidelines from sentencing judges.  
Individual offender characteristics are generally consistent with prior work 
 
suggest that values above .50 indicate at least moderate agreement, while values above .70 
suggest strong agreement. All of our aggregated measures exhibited at least moderate 
agreement and the majority approached strong levels of agreement.). 
85  Comparison of models with and without weighting procedures produced equivalent 
findings. Specifically, we examined unweighted models, models weighted by the number of 
judge respondents, and models weighted by judicial response rates (reported), all of which 
produced similar substantive conclusions. We also investigated various subsets of federal 
districts with different numbers of judge respondents and different judicial response rates 
and also found the same pattern of results. This suggests our findings are not being driven by 
different response rates across districts. These additional models are all available from the 
authors by request. 
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on federal punishment practices.86 The number of federal judgeships ranges 
from a low of 1.5 in the Eastern District of Oklahoma to a high of 28 in 
Southern District of New York.  Bar graphs for the distributions of the 
district-level survey measures are reported in the Appendix and demonstrate 
considerable variation across federal districts in both the normative and 
coercive factors.  To ease interpretation, all of the district-level survey 
measures are standardized, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
The coefficients for these measures therefore represent the effect that a one 
standard deviation increase exerts on the individual odds of receiving a 
downward departure from the judge. 
  
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Individual and District-Level Predictors 
Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
Judicial Departure .13 .33 .00 1.00 
 No Departure .60 .49 .00 1.00 
 Other Departure .27 .44 .00 1.00 
Level 1 Predictors 
Year 2006 .37 .48 .00 1.00 
Year 2007 .37 .48 .00 1.00 
Presumptive Sentence 62.87 77.19 .00 470.00 
Criminal History 2.48 1.73 1.00 6.00 
Multiple Counts .20 .40 .00 1.00 
Age 34.93 10.73 16.00 97.00 
Female .13 .34 .00 1.00 
Black .22 .41 .00 1.00 
Hispanic .42 .49 .00 1.00 
Other Race .12 .33 .00 1.00 
U.S. Citizen .69 .46 .00 1.00 
Dependents 1.58 1.73 .00 10.00 
College Education .21 .41 .00 1.00 
 
86  Albonetti, supra note 49, at 797; Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 753; Ulmer et al., 
supra note 31, at 1092. In the interest of space, descriptive statistics for reference groups 
(i.e., male, white, non-citizen, less than college education, pretrial release, plea conviction, 
and fraud offense) are omitted from Table 1. For this reason, some values do not sum to 
100%. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Individual and District-Level Predictors 
Mean SD Min Max 
Presentence Detention .72 .45 .00 1.00 
Trial Conviction .05 .21 .00 1.00 
Violent Offense .03 .18 .00 1.00 
Property Offense .02 .15 .00 1.00 
Drug Offense .37 .48 .00 1.00 
Firearms Offense .12 .32 .00 1.00 
Immigration Offense .24 .43 .00 1.00 
Other Offense .04 .20 .00 1.00 
Level 2 Predictors 
District Size .00 1.00 -.92 4.19 
 Caseload Pressure .00 1.00 -.97 4.94 
Crime Rate .00 1.00 -2.34 2.97 
Organizational Factors     
Normative Influences .00 1.00 -3.42 2.45 
Coercive Guidelines .00 1.00 -1.62 3.67 
Coercive USAO .00 1.00 -1.92 2.85 
Coercive Circuit Court .00 1.00 -2.14 1.65 
B.  DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM GUIDELINES 
Table 2 reports the findings from the random coefficient model for 
individual (i.e., level 1) effects on judicial departures from the Guidelines.  
The odds of departure are greater for cases with higher presumptive 
Guidelines sentences.  A one-standard deviation increase in the presumptive 
sentence raises the odds of downward departure by 40%.  Federal judges 
may view very long sentences as overly punitive and longer sentences may 
offer greater opportunity for judges to deviate below recommendations.  In 
general, this effect coincides with findings from nearly all federal 
sentencing research—the Guidelines presumptive sentence is among the 
strongest predictors of federal punishment outcomes.87 In terms of 
 
87  See, e.g., Kautt supra note 42, at 658; Paula Kautt et al., Cracking Down on Black 
Drug Offenders? Testing for Interactions Among Offenders’ Race, Drug Type, and 
Sentencing Strategy in Federal Drug Sentences, 19 JUST. 1, 27 (2002); Hartley et al., supra 
note 49, at 394–95; Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 768; Spohn & Fornango, supra note 13, 
at 814; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 5, at 16–18; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012 
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extralegal offender characteristics, older offenders are slightly more likely 
to receive downward departures from judges and female offenders are 
notably more likely than male offenders to receive them.  Being female 
increases the odds of departure by 27%.  Black and Hispanic defendants, 
however, are significantly less likely to benefit from downward departures.  
The odds for black and Hispanic defendants are .81 and .78 times that of 
whites respectively.  In addition, more educated defendants are also more 
likely to benefit from judicial departures; defendants with college schooling 
have odds of departure that are 17% greater than defendants without higher 
education.  These findings are consistent with prior sociological work on 
social stratification and inequality in federal punishment.88 
 
Table 2.  Hierarchical Generalized Linear Random Coefficient Model 
of Judicial Guidelines Downward Departures – Individual-Level Effects 
 Judicial Departure 89 
 b SE Odds 
Constant -1.76 .08 — *** 
Level 1 Predictors  
Year 2006 -.06 .05 .95 
Year 2007 -.02 .06 .98 
Presumptive Sentence× .34 .03 1.40 *** 
Criminal History× -.02 .01 .98 
Multiple Counts× -.04 .03 .96 
Age× .01 .00 1.01 *** 
Female× .24 .03 1.27 *** 
Black× -.21 .03 .81 *** 
Hispanic× -.25 .05 .78 *** 
Other Race -.23 .06 .80 *** 
U.S. Citizen .05 .05 1.05 
Dependents .01 .01 1.01 
 
REPORT, supra note 6, at 58; Ulmer et al., supra note 11, at 830; Ulmer et al., supra note 31, 
at 1098.  
88  Albonetti, supra note 49, at 811–12; Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 764; 
Steffensmeier et al., supra note 1, at 715–16.  
89  To simplify presentation of results, only contrasts between judicial departure and no 
departure are reported in this and subsequent tables. 
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Table 2.  Hierarchical Generalized Linear Random Coefficient Model 
of Judicial Guidelines Downward Departures – Individual-Level Effects 
 Judicial Departure 89 
 b SE Odds 
College Education .15 .02 1.17 *** 
Presentence Detention× -.85 .03 .43 *** 
Trial Conviction -.11 .06 .89 * 
Violent Offense .08 .07 1.08 
Property Offense -.36 .06 .70 *** 
Drug Offense .11 .08 1.12 
Firearms Offense .16 .04 1.17 *** 
Immigration Offense .27 .09 1.31 ** 
  Other Offense .12 .04 1.13 ** 
N1 162,870  
N2 82  
District-Level Variance .41 *** 
p ≤ .05** p ≤ .01  *** p ≤ .001  
× Random coefficient varies significantly across districts 
 
Case processing factors also affect the odds of downward departure in 
ways consistent with prior literature.  For instance, defendants detained 
prior to trial are less than half as likely as released defendants to receive 
departures, and defendants convicted at trial are also significantly less likely 
to receive downward departures.  Notable differences also emerge for 
different crime categories.  Compared to fraud offenders who serve as the 
reference group, property offenders are less likely to receive downward 
departures whereas individuals convicted for firearms or immigration 
crimes are significantly more likely to receive them.  The increased odds of 
departure for firearms offenses may reflect the especially long federal 
mandatory sentences associated with them, whereas departures for 
immigration crimes are likely tied to the expedited use of deportation.90 
  
 
90  Richard Hartley et al., Defending the Homeland: Judicial Sentencing Practices for 
Federal Immigration Offenses, 29 JUST. Q. 76, 97–98, 101 (2012). 
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Table 3 reports the findings for district-level predictors of judicial 
departures.  To first investigate whether or not the likelihood of departure 
varied across courts, we examined unconditional models (not reported in 
tabular form) that clearly demonstrated significant variation in the 
likelihood of downward departure across federal districts (χ2=6311.4 df=81; 
p=.000). This variation remained substantial and statistically significant 
after individual level predictors were included in the model (χ2=6031.6; 
df=81; p=.000).  In fact, the inclusion of individual-level predictors did 
little to explain inter-district variation in the judicial use of downward 
departures, which suggests that variation is not the product of compositional 
differences in case characteristics across courts.  To illustrate the magnitude 
of inter-district variation in judicial Guidelines circumvention, downward 
departures were awarded in only 4% of cases in the Northern District of 
Mississippi, but they were meted out in 31% of cases in the Districts of 
Table 3.  Hierarchical Generalized Linear Random Coefficient Model of 
Judicial Guidelines Departures- District-Level Effects 
 Judicial Departure 
 
b SE Odds 
Constant -1.78 .07 — *** 
Level 2 Predictors 
District Size .10 .05 1.10 * 
Caseload Pressure .03 .02 1.03  
Crime Rate -.07 .04 .93 † 
Organizational Factors     
Normative Factor -.11 .05 .89 * 
Coercive Guidelines -.13 .05 .87 ** 
Coercive USAO -.05 .06 .95  
 Coercive Circuit Court -.18 .04 .84 *** 
N1 162,870  
N2 82 
District-Level Variance .22 *** 
Between-District R2 46% 
† p ≤ .10  * p ≤ .05  ** p ≤ .01  *** p ≤ .001  
Note: Model includes all level-1 predictors reported in Table 2.  Estimates 
weighted by district-level response rates. 
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Connecticut and Eastern New York. Because inclusion of the level-2 
predictors in the model did not substantively change the estimates for the 
level-1 variables, Table 3 is restricted to the district-level effects. 
More favorable perceptions of the Guidelines reflected in the 
normative factor are associated with increased guidelines conformity.  That 
is, stronger normative views of the Guidelines reduce the likelihood of 
judicial departures. A one standard deviation increase in the normative scale 
reduces the odds of downward departure by a factor of .89. Coercive 
influences tied to the Guidelines and circuit courts are also associated with 
decreased odds of judicial departure.  Downward departures are less likely 
in judicial districts where the Guidelines are perceived to be more 
restrictive.  A one standard deviation increase in the perceived coerciveness 
of the Guidelines multiplies the odds of departure by a factor of .87.  Even 
larger effects emerge for the perceived coercive power of circuit courts.  In 
districts where judges view the circuit as more conservative and more likely 
to reverse their decisions they are less likely to grant departure sentences.  
A one standard deviation increase in the perceived coerciveness of the 
circuit multiplies the odds of downward departure by .84, after accounting 
for individual-level offense and offender characteristics. The effect for 
perceived coerciveness of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices was also in the expected 
direction, suggesting more coercive offices are negatively associated with 
judicial departures, but this effect failed to achieve statistical significance.91 
Judicial perceptions of the coerciveness of the Guidelines could be the 
product of historical patterns of guideline departures in the district. To 
investigate this issue, we estimated supplemental models that controlled for 
prior pre-Booker departure rates of districts (FY2003–FY2004).  Although 
this measure was, as one would expect, positively related to the odds of 
downward departure (b=.09; SE=.01; p≤.001), it had virtually no effect on 
the estimate for judicial perceptions of the coerciveness of the Guidelines 
(b=-14; SE=0.04; p≤.001). This shows that judicial perceptions of the 
coercive influence of the Guidelines influence departure independent of 
time-stable differences between districts that might also influence the 
likelihood of departures. 
Some of our district level control variables also demonstrate 
noteworthy effects.  Larger districts are more likely to grant judicial 
 
91  Additional analyses (not reported) also investigated potential interactions between 
extralegal offender characteristics and district-level organizational factors.  Few of these 
interactions were statistically significant and none were substantively large.  These analyses 
are not reported but are available from the first author by request.  
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departures.  Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the number of 
judgeships increases the odds of departure by 10%.  District-level crime 
rates are also marginally related to the odds of judicial departure, with each 
unit increase associated with a 7% decrease in the odds of judicial 
departure. 
Overall, the findings for inter-district variation in judicial departures 
provide support for the importance of normative perceptions of the 
guidelines and for the influence of coercive forces that contextualize the 
individual sentencing landscape across federal district courts.  Collectively, 
the district-level predictors explained 45% of the total inter-district 
variation in judicial downward departures.  Results of this study provide 
clear evidence of contextual variation in judicial conformity to the 
Guidelines.  Inter-district variation in judicial departures remained highly 
significant even after accounting for a broad array of relevant offense and 
offender considerations. To place the magnitude of this variation in 
additional context, the mean probability of receiving a judge-initiated 
downward departure varied between 8% and 25% across one standard 
deviation of federal district courts, and it varied between 4% and 39% 
across two standard deviations.92 
 Judicial perceptions and attitudes toward the Guidelines were strongly 
related to the likelihood of downward departure across districts.  Judges in 
districts that attached greater normative and moral force to the Guidelines 
were less likely to deviate from them.  Court contexts where the Guidelines 
were viewed as more effective and legitimate were also characterized by 
lower odds of judicial departure.  Taken as a whole, these findings suggest 
that important district variance exists in judicial attitudes regarding the 
normative and coercive force attached to the Guidelines as well as in 
attitudes toward circuit courts and their likelihood of reversal on appeal. 
IV.  QUALITATIVE INSIGHTS 
We conducted more than 300 qualitative, open-ended interviews with 
federal court actors in eight geographically-dispersed districts, and these 
offer additional insights into these and related sources of contextual 
variation in organizational conformity to the Guidelines (the interviews 
were collected on the condition that the names of individuals and of 
districts would be kept anonymous).  The interviews highlight important 
 
92  These estimates are derived by setting all individual-level predictors in the model to 
their means and then using the district-level variance component to calculate one and two 
standard deviation increases and decreases in the probability of departure.   
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themes involving normative constraint, coercive social forces, and also 
mimetic, uncertainty-reducing influences that affect organizational 
conformity and deviation from the Guidelines.  The interviews suggest that 
these three types of influence often operate distinctively, but can also 
combine in unique ways to shape district-level conformity to and departure 
from the Guidelines. 
A.  VARIATION IN NORMATIVE CONSTRAINT 
Consistent with our quantitative findings, the interview data suggest 
that many judges clearly recognize the moral force and normative 
constraints of the Guidelines.  A judge in one medium-sized southeastern 
district, for instance, noted that there are “fairly decent guidelines on when 
you may depart downwardly,” and he went on to say  
I don’t look at the downward departure provisions of the Guidelines as an excuse for 
me to impose my own type of sentence and find some colorful basis for downward 
departure, even when I believe the U.S. Attorney isn’t going to fuss about it.  I don’t 
do that.  I sort of go by the book as much as I can.   
Another judge in the same district stated: “I was skeptical of the Guidelines 
at first, largely, because of the bureaucratic nature of them.  But I do feel 
that a core value of uniformity in sentencing and certainty in sentencing are 
both things that I believe in.” 
A judge in a large southern district similarly articulated a mixture of 
normative and coercive reasons for avoiding departures from the 
Guidelines: 
I like the Guidelines.  I ask what is happening nationwide?  And what does Congress 
want us to do?  I respect that.  They force us to give reasons why we sentence the way 
that we do and I think that is good.  There are no crazy sentences.  The Guidelines 
eliminated extremes, and if you give an extreme you’ve got to say why.  And there is 
almost no reason to.  The Guidelines keep us humble, and most say that judges could 
use to be humbled. 
By contrast, some judges in other districts seemed more critical of the 
Guidelines on normative grounds, expressing clear willingness to depart.  
For example, a judge in a large west coast district stated, “This is the 
‘anguish of the drug war.’  You want to ameliorate the excessiveness of the 
penalties through departures. . . . If they have more than their share of 
hardships I will take a look at their circumstances.” 
Similarly, a judge in a small northeast district noted his respect and 
appreciation for the Guidelines, but expressed clear willingness to depart 
from them when necessary and believed that the normative credibility of the 
Guidelines was enhanced by allowing departures.  He admitted: 
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I am perceived as being somewhat overly sensitive to the human qualities of the 
individual defendant.  You know, it would be nice if there were more departures.  I 
am an advocate for judicial discretion within the parameters of the Guideline system.  
I believe in the Guidelines. I think they’re great.  But I think more flexibility gives 
them greater credibility. 
As these brief quotations suggest, judges recognize the moral and 
normative force of the Guidelines, even though there are clear inter-district 
variations in their perceptions of the ability and need for sentences that 
depart from them. 
B.  VARIATION IN COERCIVE CONSTRAINT 
Our quantitative findings also indicated that districts that viewed the 
Guidelines as more restrictive and less flexible and those that perceived the 
circuit courts to be less supportive and more likely to reverse decisions 
were less likely to depart from the Guidelines. The interviews clearly 
contained differing themes about coercive pressures across court contexts.  
One judge in a medium-sized southeastern district expressed disdain for the 
federal justice system’s efforts to promote conformity.  He noted: 
Lots of offices are trying to tell judges what to do.  Federal Judicial Center (FJC), 
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (AOUSC).  I don’t know if it’s affecting people 
but they’re trying.  They make judges go to trainings, conferences.  Always a press for 
uniformity.  There are bulletins from the FJC, school for new judges . . . et cetera.  
A number of court actors also recognized that the circuit courts loomed 
large in their decisions to depart from the Guidelines. Reflecting on 
departures in one particular circuit, a judge in a large midwestern district 
noted that: “[t]he attitude among district judges is that the [Xth] Circuit is 
nasty on downward departures,” and that 
has a deterrent effect on district judges.  The [Xth] Circuit is very conservative.  I 
think a lot of judges, if they didn’t have to worry about that, they would depart 
because you really need to look at these situations on an individual case-by-case basis.  
You can’t look at every, you know, all these drug crimes as being all the same, 
because they’re not.  Same with bank robbery cases, same with everything.  
Everything. 
In contrast, other circuit court environments were perceived to be far less 
constraining with regard to judicial departure decisions. According to a 
judge in a medium-sized northeastern district: 
You have seen more downward departures.  That statistic is on the up.  But all that 
shows is that we follow the law.  Since they said you can do it, we do it.  But when 
they were saying we couldn’t, you didn’t see very many departures.  Judges are pretty 
staunch about following the law, me included.  We whine, we complain, but we 
follow it.  [Our Circuit] has always said our discretion is the key.  
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He elaborated that judges could “try to get them to see and to convince 
them that if you do see it as unusual as we see it, then that is a proper 
judicial function to depart.  And you won’t be reversed.  Be confident in 
that.” Another judge in the same circuit, but a different district similarly 
noted: 
If I tend to think that I’m a little vulnerable [in my departure reasoning] . . . I’ll throw 
in totality of circumstances.  It’s pretty tough to lose under totality of circumstances.  
You know, they make the circumstances unusual.  Very seldomly will the [Yth] 
Circuit reverse. [sic] 
These statements illustrate that judges are aware of the coercive power 
of circuit courts to reverse their departure decisions, and they further 
highlight the variation that exists in these perceptions across district court 
contexts.  Similar views were expressed by other federal court actors as 
well.  The U.S. Attorney in a medium-sized southern district, for instance, 
noted that “The [Zth] Circuit is fairly strict constructionists on statutory 
interpretation.  It is very pro-sentencing Guidelines.  It reads them very 
strictly and that’s a blessing to the prosecution because we . . . can appeal 
departures and don’t have to worry, ‘what’s the Circuit going to do?’” 
In contrast, a U.S. Attorney in a large west coast district took a more 
“middle of the road” stance on appealing departures and stated, “Generally, 
I think my sense is unless it’s a really bad decision, truly out of bounds, that 
we won’t appeal.”  In this district, the U.S. Attorney’s office was relatively 
uninterested in appealing judicial departures.  The U.S. Attorney continued, 
noting the stance of the circuit and stating “The judges here shouldn’t be 
feeling that they don’t have sufficient discretion . . . because they’ve 
exercised it and we have challenged them very rarely on that exercise of 
discretion.  It’s a tough challenge to make in [our] Circuit anyway.”  He 
concluded, “if a judge is articulate enough, he [sic] can justify a departure 
that will withstand the power of review in any appellate case.”  Finally, a 
judge in another northeastern district expressed the broad acceptability of 
departures in his district, noting that: 
There is not a single case with the exception of a mandatory minimum case . . . where 
there’s no [defense] request for departure of some kind. I will say that in many ways, 
very often, the majority of cases in which I depart the government agrees.  I’ve been a 
judge for 7 years; the government’s appealed me once. 
C.  MIMETIC INFLUENCE: THE UNCERTAINTY REDUCTION INFLUENCE 
OF GUIDELINES 
Although our quantitative analysis did not have direct measures of 
mimetic influences affecting Guideline conformity and departures, many of 
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our interviews contained important themes related to them.  All sentencing 
guidelines reduce uncertainty by categorizing offenses and offenders and by 
making bounded sentence recommendations in connection with those 
classifications.93 The federal Guidelines provide an “anchoring structure” 
that defines the parameters of applicable sentences in ways that help 
simplify complex decision-making processes—they categorize cases and 
provide enhanced predictability and reduced uncertainty in punishment.  
The interview data suggest an important role for this kind of mimetic, 
uncertainty-reducing influence.  One prominent theme that emerged was the 
important role of the Guidelines in simplifying sentencing and reducing 
uncertainty through the categorization and ranking of offenses, offenders, 
and sentences. Regardless of individual opinions about whether the 
Guidelines were too harsh or not, there was broad consensus that the 
Guidelines did in fact help to anchor sentencing decisions while reducing 
unwanted uncertainty.  For example, one federal probation officer in a 
medium-sized northeastern district even complained that: 
The Guidelines have reduced . . . judges to a “cookbook mentality.” If it calls for a 
tablespoon they are not going to alter that.  The Guidelines provide a recipe for 
judges.  It’s easy, a judge can look at it and say, “Guidelines say this, this is what I am 
going to do, I don’t have to think about adapting them to something else.” . . .  If we 
stopped sending pre-sentences to the court [containing Guideline calculations], some 
of the judges would be totally lost.   
Two judges in a large midwestern district characterized the usefulness of 
the Guidelines for cognitively structuring decision making as follows: 
I’m not one of those people who rail against the Guidelines like a lot of other people 
do, and I actually think the goals of it are good because I certainly think that when I 
was a prosecutor, you know, generally they did it by sort of a gestalt.  Now there is a 
framework. . . . And I think that they’re good because maybe they sort of give 
guidance to everybody and to the court. 
My attitude towards the Guidelines has evolved over the years, judges who entered 
the bench before the Guidelines have a very different view, they chafe, they hate 
them, blah, blah, blah.  I came on the bench after.  I don’t feel the same, it is not as 
personal to me, all I know about is the Guidelines . . . I view the Guidelines as a tool 
to achieve a just result.  I try to do the right thing while trying to apply the Guidelines. 
A judge in the medium southwestern district largely agreed and noted that: 
See, I started my career after the Guidelines came into effect and I never had the 
power that my colleagues who set forth periods of time before the Guidelines went 
into effect had.  I never had the power of discretion, so I never felt the loss of 
discretion.  I think the Guidelines conceptually are a good idea. 
 
93  KRAMER & ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 26–32.  
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A U.S. Attorney in a large midwestern district noted that not only are 
the Guidelines cognitive decision-making aids, but they also ease the 
emotional burden of having to decide punishments on their own: 
Some of them [judges] are relieved that they do not have as much discretion.  There 
are some district court judges who like the sentencing guidelines because they don’t 
like to make the hard decisions.  Guidelines relieved them of a lot of that.  You talk to 
judges over drinks and some tell you that their brothers and sisters for the most part 
love them, it takes the burden off their shoulders.  They love the fact that they don’t 
have to make these hard calls.  But then there are some that realize that, “Jesus, this is 
my job.”  I am sure it is those guys that are doing the departures. 
A judge in a large southern district agreed with the U.S. Attorney above: “I 
think eventually for many judges the guidelines provide some insulation 
from kind of the raw human pain that is involved in sentencing somebody.”  
In addition, a judge in a northeastern district elaborated on this theme of 
how Guidelines simplify sentencing both cognitively and emotionally: 
I think initially the judges were overwhelmingly pleased with Guidelines because it’s 
a tremendous moral burden to carry around with you.  To pronounce these sentences 
on people like they’re coming out of your head, and that’s what you’re doing, and you 
have to sleep with it at night, and wasn’t it wonderful to have a set of guidelines that 
almost mathematically told you what the sentence was, and therefore it absolved you, 
basically, of the moral responsibility, to some extent, of whether the sentence was too 
harsh, whether you should have considered some of these other factors, yadda, yadda, 
yadda.   
Like some of the quotes above, additional insights from an 
experienced Chief Federal Defender in a small southern district contrasted 
older judges, who sentenced pre-Guidelines, to judges appointed later, who 
leaned on and embraced the Guidelines.  He noted that for “District court 
judges who were on the bench in the past, the Guidelines were painful.  The 
judges were resentful of the Guidelines.”  However, over time his district 
established “a very strict routine under the Guidelines” in which judges are 
expected to “just follow the rules,” and he explained: 
The rules do not look as problematic to them [newer judges] as they do to somebody 
who came before them.  [The Guidelines] gave them structure.  The newer judges 
have never had the option to do anything else . . . they lean on the Guidelines a lot 
more than judges did that were on the bench when the guidelines became effective.  It 
seems to me like before, the [old] judges were often looking for an excuse to do 
something outside the Guidelines.  Where now, with these [newer] judges, you really 
have to show them something that tells them that they should do this [depart below 
Guidelines], you know.  They still may say, “Well, I recognize that I have this 
discretion, but I choose not to use it.” 
Finally, the Chief Federal Defender in a small northeastern district 
contrasted her experience in her current and former districts.  She perceived 
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that judges in her former district uncritically followed the Guidelines 
because it was cognitively (and perhaps emotionally) easier to do so.  She 
appreciated that judges in her current district felt free to depart from the 
Guidelines: 
I’ve seen judges that I think hide behind the Guidelines . . . rather than be creative or 
interpret the Guidelines in a judicial fashion, I’ve seen judges hiding behind them.  
“Sorry, I’ve washed my hands on this one.”  I saw that a lot in [former district]. Some 
judges would do mass sentencings, 20 or 30 hearings a day, and just read out centuries 
of time. 
In her current district, she felt the judges were “open to sentencing 
arguments” and “they did their judicial duty to find departures where there 
was a reason.”  These comments comparing two different districts highlight 
both the general importance of mimetic, uncertainty-reducing influences in 
guidelines conformity, and also the notable differences that can occur in 
these justifications and in the use of Guidelines departures across federal 
court communities. 
CONCLUSION 
We argue that the federal courts represent an important organizational 
field in which local norms and organizational influences play a key role in 
explaining conformity to, and deviation from, institutional rules. U.S. 
district courts can be seen as local organizational arenas whose punishment 
decisions are subject to a set of overarching field-wide rules—i.e., 
sentencing Guidelines—that constrain judicial discretion with a mixture of 
regulative, normative, and mimetic social force. District courts are inhabited 
by court actors who make sense of formal institutional rules through the 
lens of locally-interpreted organizational norms and expectations. 
We investigate these social influences, focusing on different types of 
organizational pressure for judicial conformity to the Guidelines. We 
measure one specific aspect of that organizational culture relevant to federal 
courts and their relationship with the Guidelines: the collective judicial 
attitudes about the Guidelines’ normative and coercive influences. We 
examine normative influences that encourage conformity through the 
perceived moral force and legitimacy of the Guidelines, as well as coercive 
influences that encourage Guideline conformity through various types of 
regulative constraints.  Our interview data help to illustrate these influences 
and also raise the potential importance of additional, mimetic forces, or 
cultural-cognitive pressures toward conformity that are rooted in 
organizational goals of decision-making efficiency and uncertainty 
reduction. 
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Our results are consistent with prior socio-legal research that suggests 
local court actors often implement formal legal policies in locally distinct 
ways.94 Indeed, our findings suggest district court sentencing practices are 
coupled to the Guidelines to varying degrees, depending on judicial 
interpretations and perceptions of the Guidelines and on surrounding 
pressures to conform to them.  The collective perceptions among judges of 
the Guidelines as normatively legitimate, their definitions of the 
coerciveness of the Guidelines and the local circuit court climate, are all 
intimately related to contextual patterns of Guidelines conformity.  In short, 
our analysis implies that the federal criminal justice system and its 
sentencing Guidelines represent an “inhabited institution,”95 where local 
actors’ efforts at sense-making produce important variation in punishment 
outcomes for individual defendants. 
The court communities’ perspective views courts as open systems 
within organizational fields, influencing and being influenced by their 
surrounding socio-political contexts.  Thus, we do not wish to argue that 
collective judicial attitudes, as a measure of one component of court 
community culture, exist in isolation of broader influences.  Much research 
demonstrates that courts vary substantially in their sentencing practices in 
connection with factors like court caseloads and crime dynamics, 
surrounding political features, the size of local racial and ethnic minority 
populations, local religious climate, and others.96 Thus, judicial attitudes 
about the normative value and coercive influence of the Guidelines are 
quite likely shaped by factors both internal and external to the courthouse 
itself.  However, empirically assessing the influences on the judicial 
attitudes themselves is beyond the scope of this study. 
Despite its unique contributions, our study has other important 
limitations as well. The use of judge surveys to tap into local court 
organizational culture comes with limitations tied to survey research.  As 
with any survey instrument, nonresponse bias, measurement error and 
cognitive biases may affect our measures of court culture.  The fact that our 
results are not sensitive to different response rates (see Appendix, 
Table A3) provides some assurance against these concerns, though it will 
be important for future work to replicate these findings.  Another notable 
limitation of our data is that we cannot connect individual judge survey 
 
94  Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 547–49; Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 767–
68; Lynch & Omori, supra note 51, at 411. 
95 See Tim Hallett, The Myth Incarnate: Recoupling Processes, Turmoil, and Inhabited 
Institutions in an Urban Elementary School, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 52, 53 (2010). 
96  Ulmer, supra note 47, at 13–16.  
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responses to individual judges’ sentences. The USSC does not publicly 
release data on individual sentences by judge nor do they publicly provide 
anonymous judge identifiers.97 If future research could obtain judge 
identifiers, and could connect individual judge attitudinal or other survey 
measures to individual judges’ sentencing decisions, this would be a major 
contribution to the literature. 
Future work could expand on this research in several other productive 
directions.  First, we focus only on collective judicial perceptions and their 
effects on judicial departures from guidelines.  However, the incorporation 
of perceptions from other court actors could broaden the scope of the 
current work and open the door for additional lines of inquiry.  For instance, 
prosecutor surveys could be used to inform our understanding of 
prosecutor-controlled departures, especially since these types of departures 
are frequently embedded in the guilty plea process.  Second, our focus on 
Guideline departures reflects organizational perspectives on the tension 
between formal institutional rules and local court actor behavior,98 but it is 
important to recognize that judges make several other consequential 
decisions that are also embedded in the local culture of the court.  
Predominant case processing strategies, pretrial decisions, and other 
punishment outcomes, such as the likelihood and length of incarceration 
should be examined in future work on the organizational contexts of 
sentencing. 
As described at the outset, the Guidelines were once mandatory, but 
the 2005 Booker decision ruled the Guidelines advisory and restored 
considerable sentencing discretion to federal judges, which weakened their 
coercive power to restrict departures as a matter of law.99 Yet, recent 
research shows that the Guidelines continue to exert strong influence on 
federal sentencing, and while judge-initiated departures have increased 
compared to pre-Booker years, the large majority of sentences conform to 
the Guidelines.100 We suspect that this is because the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines do not merely, or even now primarily, influence through 
 
97  Max Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: 
Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV., 715, 720–29 (2008).  
98  See generally JAMES MARCH & HERBERT SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958) (on formal 
and informal organizational rules and decision-making). 
99  Stith, supra note 25, at 1477.   
100  Kaiser & Spohn, supra note 12, at 261–62; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N’S 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/about/2015-
annual-report/archive/annual-report-2011; Ulmer et al., supra note 11, at 830; Ulmer et al., 
supra note 31, at 1098.  
ULMER_FINAL PROOF_3.30.17 4/21/2017  3:08 PM 
288 ULMER & JOHNSON [Vol. 107 
 
regulative constraint, but also through informal normative influence, and 
perhaps mimetic influence (by providing useful tools to manage 
uncertainty).  Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that 
judges need not presume that the Guidelines are reasonable sentences in 
given cases,101 and that judges may depart from the Guidelines if they 
disagree with them on policy grounds.102 Therefore, the regulatory influence 
of the Guidelines has been significantly reduced, which likely makes 
normative influences more important in constraining judicial departures.  
Our interview data further suggest that the Guidelines also serve an 
important uncertainty-reducing function, and that district courts’ reliance on 
them illustrates a form of mimetic isomorphism.103 
Additional research is therefore necessary to examine the complex 
interplay between legal shifts in sentencing policy and patterns of 
conformity to institutional rules such as the Guidelines.  In the wake of not 
only Booker, but subsequent decisions104 that occurred after our survey was 
collected, local organizational contexts may become even more important 
as the Guidelines’ formal legal constraints are further weakened.  This 
suggests that court conformity to the Guidelines may depend increasingly 
on their normative or mimetic (e.g., uncertainty reduction) influences. 
Thus, to the extent that the Guidelines have become embedded in 
federal sentencing practice as anchoring rules and normative standards, they 
will continue to shape the landscape of federal sentencing, but they may 
increasingly be subject to local interpretation and adaptation. In some ways, 
the role of normative influence may be especially important. For instance, 
Kaiser and Spohn105 recently found that district judges around the country 
have expressed policy disagreements with the Guidelines’ 
recommendations for non-production child pornography sentences by 
departing downward at very high rates. Such policy disagreement 
departures may become more common,106 reflecting the reduced coercive 
influence of the contemporary Guidelines. This also suggests that the 
Guidelines may exert very different levels of normative influence over 
 
101  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 39, 50 (2007). 
102  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007). 
103  Ulmer, supra note 4, at 255–56.  
104  See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 38–39; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 85–89; Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 338–40 (2007).   
105  Kaiser & Spohn, supra note 12, at 262; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, 
Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 853, 887 
(2011). 
106  Kaiser & Spohn, supra note 12, at 259.  
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sentencing for different crimes.  A few years ago, the USSC requested that 
Congress direct district courts to give the Guidelines “substantial weight” in 
sentencing decisions, to provide a “presumption of reasonableness” 
standard to Guidelines sentences, and to provide a “heightened standard of 
review” for departure sentences based on policy disagreements.107 Our 
research here implies that in the contemporary context, a major way to 
encourage district courts to give the Guidelines substantial weight would be 
to listen to the signals that judge-initiated departures send, because these 
may indicate an important lack of normative alignment between specific 
Guideline sentences and the attitudes of district judges. Seen this way, 
judicial departures are not necessarily indicative of troublesome 





107  Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1730–32 
(2012).  
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APPENDIX: DISTRICT COMPARISONS, INTER-RATER AGREEMENT, 
WEIGHTING AND BAR CHARTS 
 










District Characteristics  Mean Mean   
Total Crime Rate 36.41 37.57  -.23 
Number of Judgeships 7.56 4.25  1.62 
Total Departure Rate .35 .37  -.42 
Judge Departure Rate .11 .10  .22 
Caseload Pressure (cases 
per judge) 
333.01 368.40  -.35 
Total Population 3,461,394 2,528,178  .89 
% Black Population 13.28% 10.30%  .70 
% Hispanic Population 9.81% 8.67%  .28 
Median Household Income $49,130.84 $50,696.73  -.50 
% Population in Poverty 13.7% 12.6%  .89 
% Male Judges in District 79.2% 86.7%  -1.13 
% White Judges in District 86.0% 86.1%  -.02 




Table A2.  Inter-rater Agreement for Survey Measures  
Aggregated to District Level 
rWG index  
 Mean SD  
Organizational Factors    
Normative Factor .69 .27  
Coercive Guidelines .51 .35  
Coercive Circuit Court .69 .27  
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Table A3.  Comparison of District Organizational Factors for 
Weighted and Unweighted Estimates 
  Judicial Departures 
   Model 1 
Weighted by District 
Response Rate 
 
  b SE Odds  
Constant -1.78 .07 -- *** 
Level 2 Predictors  
 District Size .10 .05 1.11 * 
 Caseload Pressure .03 .02 1.03  
 Crime Rate -.07 .04 .93 † 
Organizational Factors  
 Normative Factor -.11 .05 .90 * 
 Coercive Guidelines -.13 .05 .88 ** 
 Coercive USAO -.05 .06 .95   
 Coercive Cir. Court -.18 .04 .84 *** 
N1   162,870  
N2   82  
† p ≤ .10  * p ≤ .05** p ≤ .01  *** p ≤ .001 
Note:  Models include all additional level-1 predictors reported in  
Tables 2 & 3 
 
  
ULMER_FINAL PROOF_3.30.17 4/21/2017  3:08 PM 
292 ULMER & JOHNSON [Vol. 107 
 
 
Table A3.  Comparison of District Organizational Factors for 
Weighted and Unweighted Estimates Cont’d 
  Judicial Departures 




  b SE Odds  
Constant -1.76 .06 -- *** 
Level 2 Predictors  
 District Size .13 .04 1.14 ** 
 Caseload Pressure .00 .04 1.00  
 Crime Rate -.06 .04   .94 † 
Organizational Factors  
 Normative Factor -.13 .05   .88 * 
 Coercive Guidelines -.10 .05   .90 * 
 Coercive USAO -.05 .05   .95   
 Coercive Cir. Court -.21 .05 .81 *** 
N1   162,870  
N2   82  
† p ≤ .10  * p ≤ .05** p ≤ .01  *** p ≤ .001 
Note:  Models include all additional level-1 predictors reported in  
Tables 2 & 3 
 
